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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. McKay's Application for 
Post-Conviction Relief Because the Jury Instructions Failed to Instruct Regarding 
the Element of Cause and That Element Was at Issue in Mr. McKay's Trial. 
1. "In such unlawful manner." 
In instructing the jury regarding the elements of vehicular manslaughter, the district court 
deviated from ICJI 709, misstated the law and misled the jury by omitting the phrase "in such 
unlawful manner." At a jury instruction conference on October 29, 2004, the district court 
inquired whether trial counsel had any "objections or concerns regarding the instructions." R. 
(34271), pg. 110. In response, trial counsel indicated "we have talked briefly about cause, and 
the dilemma is what to do about cause. And I have essentially taken the position that cause is 
something that I'm not requesting a jury [instruction] on this morning, but it's certainly part of 
the dilemma." R. (34271), pg. 110. In failing to object to erroneous jury instructions, trial 
counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable manner. 
The state nevertheless contends that trial counsel did not perform deficiently because he 
requested a jury instruction that included the language "in such unlawful manner" on October 22, 
2004, and, in so doing, implicitly objected to the district court's later proposed instruction 
omitting that language. However, in filing proposed jury instructions, trial counsel "respectfully 
request[ed] this Court to consider said instructions in instructing the jury in this action." R. 83. 
In this pleading, trial counsel did not indicate that he objected to jury instructions which deviated 
from the proposed instructions. Additionally, trial counsel expressly declined to raise an 
objection to the district court's proposed instructions. Thus, the record shows that trial counsel 
did not object to the erroneous instructions because be failed to "state distinctly the instruction 
to which [he] objects and the grounds of the objection" as required by I.C.R. 30(b). 
Mr. McKay's position on the matter is essentially conceded by the state in its argument 
that appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the jury instruction issue as he was 
precluded from doing so under the invited error doctrine. Respondent's Brief, pg. 16 
("[Alppellate counsel was precluded from raising such an argument for the first time on appeal 
given that McKay's proposed elements instruction also used the word 'caused' rather than 
significant cause."). Thus, deficient performance has been established because trial counsel not 
only failed to object but actually invited the giving of the erroneous instruction. 
To the extent this Court concludes that trial counsel did object to the district court's 
instruction and that objection was overruled, then appellate counsel was deficient for failing to 
raise the preserved objection as an issue on direct appeal. The state claims the jury was "clearly 
advised" that in order to be guilty, Mr. McKay's operation of a motor vehicle while DUI must 
have caused Mr. Cox's death. Respondent's Brief, p. 17. To the contrary, the jury was 
instructed that Mr. McKay was guilty if he committed a DUI and his "operation of the motor 
vehicle caused the death of [Mr. Cox]." R. 153. Unlike ICJI 709, the district court's instruction 
failed to require the jury to link Mr. McKay's DUI with Mr. Cox's death. For instance, that Mr. 
Cox was invisible to Mr. McKay does not change the fact that his operation of a motor vehicle 
caused Mr. Cox's death. However, if Mr. Cox was invisible to Mr. McKay, the fact that Mr. 
McKay might have been under the influence of alcohol was not a significant cause of Mr. Cox's 
death because, regardless of Mr. McKay's level of intoxication, he could not have avoided hitting 
what he could not see. Thus, his operation of the vehicle "in such unlawful manner" was not a 
significant cause of the accident. 
The phrase "in such unlawful manner," which is found in the pattern instructions and 
absent from the district court's instruction, clarifies that a defendant is not guilty of vehicular 
manslaughter unless his culpable conduct caused a death. Because the omission of the phrase "in 
such unlawful manner" prejudiced Mr. McKay, the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his application for post-cofiviction relief. 
2. "Significant cause contributing to the death." 
The district court erred in replacing the phrase "significant cause contributing to the 
death," which is found in ICJI 709 and I.C. $ 18-4006(3), with the phrase "caused the death." 
Echoing the district court, the state urges that this deviation from the pattern instruction and 
statute raised the state's burden of proof and, thus, benefitted Mr. McKay. However, as 
acknowledged by the state, the legislature amended LC. 9 18-4006(3) by replacing the word 
"causes" with "significant cause" because the previous language was confusing and subject to 
inconsistent interpretations. Nonetheless, relying on the legislature's intent to broaden the 
standard of proof in vehicular homicide cases, the state asserts that the only reasonable 
interpretation of the word "causes" is to be the sole cause. However, that the legislature was 
motivated to amend the statutory language to prevent interpretations that raised the state's burden 
of proof fails to support the conclusion that the "sole cause" interpretation is the only reasonable 
one. Although interpreting "caused" as "a cause" lowers the state's burden of proof, it is 
doubtful any legislator that desired re-election would indicate a statute was being amended in 
order to make a crime more difficult to prove. 
The legislature amended LC. $ 18-4006(3) to read "significant cause" instead of "causes" 
in response to "confusion" and "inconsistent interpretations" by judges and juries. 1997 Idaho 
Session Laws Ch. 103, § 1. By instructing the jury that Mr. McKay was guilty if his operation of 
a motor vehicle "caused" Mr. Cox's death, the district court failed to clarify whether the 
operation of the vehicle must have been the only cause, a significant cause or a minor cause. For 
instance, the jury could have concluded that the absence of a taillight was the primary cause of 
the accident but that Mr. McKay's intoxication was also a contributing factor - or, in other 
words, that the absence of a taillight and Mr. McKay's intoxication "caused" the accident. Under 
the jury instructions given, the jury should have found Mr. McKay guilty even if it concluded that 
the absence of the taillight was the significant cause of the accident but that Mr. McKay's 
impaired driving "may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle accident which resulted 
in death." See Idaho Session Laws Ch. 103, § 1, Statement of Purpose. 
This sort of logic is not without precedent. For example, some people believe that the act 
of a guard helping a passenger onto a train was the cause of the injuries to Helen Palsgraff 
because if set into motion a chain of events, i.e. the dislodging of a package of fireworks, which 
resulted in the package falling upon the rails, which resulted in the fireworks exploding, the 
shock of which resulted in the throwing down of some scales at the other end of the platform 
many feet away which struck and injured Mrs. Palsgraf. Likewise here, some jurors might have 
concluded that had Mr. McKay not been driving at all the accident would not have occurred and 
thus his driving was the cause. And, in that sense, he was the cause of the accident, although not 
a significant cause because other intervening causes were more significant. The point is that 
jurors can be easily confused on this issue because the concept of what constitutes cause is 
elusive. 
What is a cause in a legal sense, still more what is a proximate cause, depend in 
each case upon many considerations, as does the existence of negligence itself. 
Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us. A boy throws a stone 
into a pond. The ripples spread. The water level rises. The history of that pond is 
altered to all eternity. It will be altered by other causes also. Yet it will be forever 
the resultant of all causes combined. Each one will have an influence. How great 
only omniscience can say. You may speak of a chain, or, if you please, a net. An 
analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without each the 
future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But 
that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole 
cause. There is no such thing. 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J. dissenting). 
The jury instructions here permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty even if the state 
had not met its burden to prove that Mr. McKay's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of 
Mr. Cox's death. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that replacing the phrase 
"significant cause contributing to the death" with the word "caused" raised the state's burden of 
proof, and in suinmarily dismissing Mr. McKay's application for post-conviction relief. 
3. Prejudice. 
Because the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in Mr. 
McKay's favor with respect to the element of cause, the error in the jury instructions is 
reversible. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999); State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155, 
158, 139 P.3d 757, 760 (Ct. App. 2006). In arguing to the contrary, the state points out that there 
was evidence to contradict the defense theory that Mr. Cox's motorcycle did not have a taillight. 
However, the question is not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict 
but, rather, whether there was evidence that could have rationally led the jury to accept the 
defense theory with regard to the element on which the jury was misinstructed. 
Here, no sign of Mr. Cox's taillight, housing or assembly was found at the scene of the 
accident nor on Mr. McKay's vehicle, despite thorough searches. Tr. (31652) pg. 407, in. 15 to 
pg. 408, In. 22.; pg. 705. p. 8-14. The evidence also established that Mr. McKay did not see Mr. 
Cox's motorcycle prior to impact and that Mr. Cox "barely idl[ed] over the tracks." Tr. (31652) 
pg. 217, In. 23-24; pg. 484, in. 22-23; pg. 486, in. 11-13; pg. 634, in. 17-18; see also Tr. (31652) 
pg. 181, in. 16-20; pg. 217, in. 15-17; pg. 240, in. 17-21. If Mr. Cox's unlit motorcycle was 
almost at standstill in the dark, Mr. McKay would have been unable to prevent the accident 
regardless of his level of intoxication. Thus, there was evidence presented at trial that could have 
rationally led the jury to conclude that Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI was not the significant 
cause of the accident resulting in Mr. Cox's death. 
The state also argues that the jury's acceptance of the theory that Mr .Cox's taillight was 
not working "does not mean the jury would have concluded [Mr.] McKay's unlawful act of 
driving under influence was not a 'significant cause contributing' to [Mr. Cox's] death." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 18. Of course, a properly instructed jury might have rejected Mr. 
McKay's evidence and found him guilty. Nonetheless, because the jury instructions misstated 
the law, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to acquit Mr. McKay if it accepted his theory of 
the evidence. Accordingly, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by trial and appellate counsels' failures 
to raise the errors in the jury instruction at trial and on direct appeal. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. McKay asks this Court to 
remand his application for post-conviction relief to the district court with instruction to grant Mr. 
McKay his requested relief, or in the alternative, to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
% 
Respectfully submitted this 6day of March, 2008. 
'13,-h\g - - 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorneys for Shane McKay 
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